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John Rawls' Law of Peoples:1
Some of the Important Themes and Issues Raised
In The Law of Peoples John Rawls fashions an optimistic theory about how a stable and politically just
international legal order should be constructed among democracies acting in cooperation with non-democratic
but decent societies.
International agreements reached between these two types of nation-state are stable for sound and principled
reasons only insofar as each society in those agreements represents the reasonable interests of its various
cohesive populations, i.e, the politically constrained interests of the (potentially many) different "peoples" who
properly domicile within each society's borders. Rawlsian legitimization of law, domestically and
internationally, is predicated on societies representing their peoples' veil-constrained interests. Rawls would thus
replace the political calculus which relies solely upon categories like power, dominance, and inferiority with one
that depends upon the long-term and non self-absorbed satisfaction of citizens (neither peace by power nor
peace by impotence, but peace by bounded mutual acknowledgment). 2
Rawls uses "nation" and "state" as collecting terms which take on a different meaning than that traced back to
Thucydides. Where Rawlsian nations/states are justified in their internal rule and in their external activities it is
only because they represent the basic interests of their citizens as defined by "the reasonable,"3 and not because
they are successful over time in struggling for "power, prestige, and wealth in a condition of global anarchy."4
Legitimate states recognize that there are institutional solutions to systemic problems of dire poverty and
extreme hunger, that these calamities are never simply to be dismissed as "the will of God." 5 They recognize
that a decent society will encourage deep cooperative psychologies in its citizens (supporting the practice of
citizens living by "gentle manners" and their acting according to proper self-respect).6 Rawls' construction of
licit nationhood sharply distinguishes the idea of a reasonable, fair-minded, pluralistic, and public-spirited
nation from the more familiar realist notion of the nation-state in which states are geopolitical entities acting
primarily out of rational self-interest for their own power with no substantial constraints other than the balance
of power.
Important terms, like "citizen," receive a Rawlsian interpretation, partly based on historical contingency and
partly based on his moral ideals. Citizens are those who have come to form, and who have come to recognize the
significance of the fact that they have formed, common interests over time as mutually identified and politically
associated individuals and groups of individuals. Minimally, democratic citizens have access to the same judicial
system, vote in common in national elections, and the like. They are likely to regard the same historical events,
say a period of Founding, a Civil war, or a Great Depression, as mutually important and as being of common
(domestic) interest among themselves.7
Ideally and morally, citizens recognize mutual domestic obligations towards one another, based on factors like
those listed in the above paragraph, plus their avowed recognition that no domestic resident could have a
satisfactory life without the willing cooperation of the bulk of the others. Citizens come to rely on the
reasonable idea that cooperation which is based on mutual concern and respect creates a form of political
stability which morally justifies the state--in at least a thin "political" sense.8
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Rawls approvingly cites John Stuart Mill's account of citizenship and common nationality, even incorporating it
as a part of his own view. His remarks on Mill are worth quoting since they weaken certain objections to Rawls'
theory, namely those accusing Rawls of advocating only a jingoistic nationalism or a limiting form of western
colonialism.9 Mill says:
A portion of mankind may be said to constitute a Nationality, if they are united among themselves
by common sympathies, which do not exist between them and any others--which make them
cooperate with each other more willingly than with other people, desire to be under the same
government, and desire that it should be government by themselves, or a portion of themselves,
exclusively. This feeling of nationality may have been generated by various causes. Sometimes it is
the effect of identity or race and descent. Community of language, community of religion, greatly
contribute to it. Geographical limits are one of its causes. But the strongest of all is identity of
political antecedents; the possession of national history, and consequent community of recollections;
collective pride and humiliation, pleasure and regret, connected with the same incidents in the past.
None of these circumstances, however, are necessarily sufficient by themselves. 10
Some such grounds for citizens' cooperation are implied by any theory interested in genuinely explaining
normative civic commitment, in moving beyond reductionist modus vivendi forms of explanation, and in
analyzing the proper instantiation of those grounds in citizen's political psychology.11 Citizens who self-
consciously come to recognize proper reciprocity towards others as citizens, particularly other citizens who are
least-well-off, and who build towards a cooperative mutuality based on that recognition, engage in what Rawls
calls "moral learning." 12 Political moral learning, which builds on a positive sense of political reciprocity, is a
potentially plausible basis for stability both within liberal democracies and between reasonable states, at least
on the Rawlsian view.13
One apparent distinction between traditional realist conceptions of nation-states and the Rawlsian "nation-
state" is that Rawls deliberately (and unsurprisingly!) emphasizes states' "moral character, and the reasonably
just, or at least "decent," nature of their regimes."14 His characterization becomes more trenchant if we
consider the doctrine of moral learning while we sketch his two types of base-state-case: democracies and decent
consultation hierarchies.
Consider the familiar Rawlsian idealization for just and democratic states: A just democratic government must
be effectively stable and also under its reasonable citizen's reflective control. Citizens are "reasonable" in
Rawls' sense if they "are concerned to live with others on fair terms, assuming that the others are so willing;
they also understand that to be fair, the terms of cooperation must be ones that other free and equal persons
can accept."15
Reflection on the material requirements of justice leads citizens to move past purely formal guarantees of rights
to a deeper understanding of mutual obligations towards fellow-citizens.16 This is especially true of citizen-
understandings concerning those whose material condition precludes them from being able to reliably command
formal rights. Institutionalizing appropriately rich principles of reciprocity, i.e., institutionalizing the fact that
people will cooperate on the reasonable and well-entrenched expectation that others will,17 is an appropriate
and morally necessary response to the requirements of justice.
One primary goal of this type of mutual cooperation would be the creation of, and widespread citizen support
for, social institutions that transparently embed the idea of society as a fair system of cooperation over time.
Such support, by citizens with material resources for those citizens who are least well off, is not based on
noblesse oblige but, rather, on Rousseau's amour propre, or appropriate self-respect. Widely shared self-respect
of this type would presumably be accompanied by the mutual recognition that the institutions of society should
be arranged so that every citizen is likely to possess it.18
A democracy politically ordered by citizens operating on this kind of common understanding, whose institutions
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effectively secured the same rights for all and embodied systemic concern for the least well off, could be labeled
as roughly "well-ordered." If a sufficient number of relatively well-ordered democracies jointly supported
principles of international law for apt reasons, we would realize at least a "western" or "democratic"
overlapping basis for a Rawlsian law of peoples. Because of Rawls' commitment to pluralism across nations, as
well as within them, he does not restrict himself to liberal democracies as guiding members of the overlap,
however.
Extending pluralism into the arena of international cooperation, Rawls argues that non-democratic "decent
consultation hierarchies" should be regarded as full partners in constructing the law of peoples, at least insofar
as they sufficiently represent the reasonable interests of their various "peoples." Liberal states are to exhibit
due respect towards decent non-liberal societies by viewing them as authentic sources of the law of peoples. As
Rawls notes, "Liberal peoples must try to encourage decent peoples and not frustrate their vitality by coercively
insisting that all societies be liberal."19
Democracies and non-liberal but decent consultation hierarchies would form up the core nation-state group
supporting a just law of peoples. Rawls includes an imaginary but feasible Muslim society among his just
consultation hierarchies.20 "Moral learning" in such a society, as its citizens recognize a consultation-hierarchy-
relative sense of proper self respect, likely looks quite different than it would in a liberal society.
"Kazanistan,"an imagined non-democratic Islamic Republic, based both on ideal theory and on classical and
deeply historic Islamic principles of respect and tolerance for non-Islamic religions, is Rawls' primary example
of a decent consultation hierarchy.21
As I imagine it, this decent people is marked by its enlightened treatment of the various non-Islamic
religions and other minorities who have been living in its territory for generations, originating from
conquests long ago or from immigration which the people permitted...Unlike most Muslim rulers,
the rulers of Kazanistan have not sought empire and territory. This is in part a result of its
theologians interpreting jihad in a spiritual and moral sense, and not in military terms. The Muslim
rulers have long held the view that all members of society naturally want to be loyal members of the
country into which they are born; and that, unless they are unfairly treated and discriminated
against they will remain so. Following this idea has proved highly successful. Kazanistan's non-
Muslim members and its minorities have remained loyal and supported the government in times of
danger.22
Rawls stipulates that the Muslim rulers of Kazanistan have taken the legitimate interests of its various peoples
into account, i.e., that the rulers consult their varying "peoples," and that those various legitimate domiciled
groups are represented institutionally. These peoples' fundamental interests are known, respected, and the like.
Thus, fair terms of cooperation between Muslim and non-Muslim groups are worked out and practiced as the
political norm. The "moral learning" that citizens of Kazanistan act from regarding their legitimate Muslim
leaders and their fellow-citizens is not the same as that built up with a properly composed elected democratic
leadership and with fellow democratic citizens from within a well-ordered liberal democracy.
Presumably, a model tiered in terms of customary role-obligations within one's social and birth communities,
representing the reasonable interests of the various communities, would produce legitimate but "non-
individualist-looking" political identities and obligations that appear to be different from those found in the
liberal democratic model. One might initially think more of F.H. Bradley's My Station and Its Duties than of
John Stuart Mills' On Liberty. To be more au courant, from the perspective of well-understood first-order role
obligations, one might then think of the sort of role obligations towards loving parents that one incurs on an
argument like that expressed in Michael Hardimon's Role Obligations,23 where we contractually choose to take
on some role obligations but are also sometimes born into them/grow into them (as when we are raised by a
loving family).
It is worthy of note, to those who believe that a consultative and reasonably pluralistic hierarchical Muslim
society is a pure fiction, that Rawls' Kazanistan bears significant similarity to the political acceptance of plural
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religions within most Muslim societies established during the first several centuries of Islamic conquest after
Mohammed's death. Typically, various Christian, Jewish and Zoroastrian communities were allowed to conduct
local affairs under their own customary laws concerning marriage and the adjudication of civil disputes.24
It should be quickly added, to avoid romanticizing this militarized past, that there are strong contrasts between
the realist assumptions that Muslim conquerors acted upon and the Rawlsian view of peace by satisfaction.
Expansionist political sovereignty for Muslims via military conquest was a primary goal of early Muslim states,
and the state was viewed as an arbiter of self-centered theocratic power (much as in the Christian states of
Europe.) Most European and Muslim political history appears to fall far short of seeking peace by satisfaction
as a primary goal.
Rawls adds that Christendom has its own profound history of anti-pluralism in the form of anti-Semitism,
ranging from the inquisition through the holocaust and on to this day.25 One could observe that in the fifteenth
and sixteenth centuries Jews were clearly better off in Muslim countries than in most European ones.26
Productive theorizing about religious pluralism has become the mainstream Catholic theme only recently,
through the work of Pope John XXIII in the Second Vatican Council thirty some years ago, and the work of
John Courtney Murray, "a twentieth-century American, deeply in love with American political ideas."27 We
thus have some empirical evidence that religion-guided views which were long hostile to reasonable pluralism
can eventually come to officially embrace it.
Domestically and internationally, Rawls recommends a now familiar form of political and legal respect for
dissimilar comprehensive theories of the good. Precocious versions of such respect are now characteristically
found within large-scale liberal democracies,28 both within the same democratic polity and between distinct
liberal democracies. In Rawls' ideal world, similar respect is also found within Kazanistan, and between
Kazanistan and other decent or liberal societies.
Rawlsian pluralism, a central theme from at least the early 1980s on, finds its place in The Law of Peoples in
Rawls' insistence that all states (in his legitimizing sense) will respect the freedom and independence of other
groups and individuals, observe treaties, abstain from intervention, honor human rights, engage in war in only
very limited circumstances, and the like.29
As a thinker embedded in the western liberal tradition, meta-politically and in terms of justifying his reasoning,
Rawls draws these conclusions from a second original position in which we consider ourselves representatives of
states/peoples whose power, territory and wealth are unknown to us. If we were to entertain the idea of being
representatives within Rawls' second original position, our role would be to structure the institutions of the state
so that they represent peoples' legitimate interests, to find an agreement about the just limits to state power, and
to begin to sketch out how legitimate states are to set up law amongst themselves.
So Rawls again uses an "original position" as his preferred device of representation and, should readers
disagree with the analysis, they would be invited to generate equally desirable conclusions from their preferred
analyses. Wide reflective equilibrium, balancing morally desirable results, an explicit and careful statement of
the critic's own preferred analysis, and uncontroversial science and common sense, would provide the only
scales upon which to weigh alternative proposals from the perspective of those who would take "the
philosophical driver's seat."30
As the following article by Professor Fiala argues, there is some question as to whether Rawls himself holds an
objectionably metaphysically restrictive philosophy of history; one that would block agreement from those who
hold a Kantian philosophy of history, for instance.
Liberal democracies make a relatively decent base case in accounting for international justice. One historical
reason is that liberal democracies tend not to war with one another, or "Doyle's Law," as Rawls calls this claim
in his Oxford Amnesty lecture:31 "The crucial fact for the problem of war is that constitutional democratic
societies do not go to war with one another."32
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A second, internal-structural reason why liberal democracies make a good base-state case, is that Rawls has
long argued that liberal democracies have a basic structure which is at least compatible with justice as fairness.
Such democracies comprehend some of the values crucial to justice as fairness, e.g., political ideas like "free and
equal citizen," fundamental recognition of the moral power of individuals to pursue the good and to support
justice, and the like.
A third personal/psychological justification is that there actually exists a thin political sense of the citizen-self as
a possessor of basic rights. This sense, deeply embedded in long- standing democratic political cultures, is a
building-block that liberal views like Rawls' depend upon in order to be seen as feasible. The individual
citizen's sense of "being a rightful possessor of political powers" is a facet of her political psychology as she
marries and divorces, seeks an education and career of her own choosing, exchanges goods, worships freely,
speaks freely, and so forth. These are fundamental reasons why it is plausible to assert of democratic citizens
that they can come to possess Rousseau's amour propre. Such citizens are capable of supporting peace by
contentment or satisfaction, rather than seeing domination of others as the only honest basis of social
stability.33
Recommending this "partnership," between representative democracies and representative non-democratic
consultation hierarchies, as a sufficient theoretical basis for forging a just international order raises several
questions in the context of a world that may be too complex to be moved to justice by arguing in Rawlsian
terms. We will divide questions about Rawls' view into two sets: one which we think consists of answerable
difficulties, and one which we believe to be more intractable, even as we take an optimistic attitude, along
Rawlsian lines, about achieving global justice.
The first set advances four currently pressing issues, issues to which Rawls could plausibly reply: Among
pressing and central concerns about international justice which are in play at the present moment are: (1)
concern about the relative concentration of desperate circumstances in the southern hemisphere, (2) pragmatic
policy parameters [whether we can afford moral constraints to come in only as an afterthought if at all], (3)
relative-political questions [Should there be a relationship between foreign state-building and a preference for
the creation of democracies?], and, (4) questions of unhappy immediacy after September eleventh.
"Rawlsian" responses to these four areas of concern tell us quite a bit about his theory and about morally
available courses of action from a point-of-view which is sympathetic to Rawls' project.
The first answerable difficulty concerns the relative and large disparity in wealth between the northern and
southern hemispheres. Do we have Singer-type obligations to peoples who inhabit poor nations analogous to our
obligations to the least well off in a liberal democracy?
On one hand, Rawls' view does not automatically entail any justice-based redistribution of wealth from the
people of rich nations to those of poor nations. On the other, he recognizes that very low levels of well-being can
make the achievement of a stable and politically just state impossible, even given culturally modest expectations
for well-being. Rawls would recognize the need to redistribute resources to poor nations to the extent that such
redistribution is a necessary condition for such societies to be law-abiding members within the law of peoples.
There is, however, no direct international analogue to the domestic difference principle, which requires
economic shifts to fellow citizens which benefit the least well off among them before those who are better off can
gain additional social advantage. Within the ideal relatively just liberal state, where citizens have a strong sense
of reciprocity founded on a common history of cooperation, there should be a core communal determination to
enable the full participation of the least well-off.
Citizens of such a liberal state will simply not have the same deep sense of democratically embedded reciprocity
towards the citizens of other nations. The Law of Peoples is not so much concerned with whether "the well-
being of the globally worst off person can be improved"34 as it is with whether within each society (and by its
lights) minimal internal Humean conditions are met which allow for members of that society to secure stable
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political justice over generations.
There may be a fairly high correlation between destitute (burdened) societies and state sponsors of terror and
war (outlaw societies). Prudence and duty might be invoked in such cases. Since correcting the behavior of
outlaw states can be very expensive in terms of the costs of war, prudence would dictate some attention to the
problem of burdened societies which are apt to become outlaw states. Duty might also require wealthy nations
to work along with burdened states to allow the latter to achieve the material and political conditions necessary
to create a decent consultative or a just democratic society. This is likely to involve as much or more attention
to political change or to institutional reform as it does to simple redistribution of money or physical resources.35
Societies that are just in ideal theory axiomatically have sufficient resources to stabilize themselves in terms of
the requirements of justice for their members, and thus meet the condition of members' having their needs met
sufficiently for them to be reasonably expected to behave justly towards other citizens, as well as towards the
rest of the world. But this is emphatically not the same as saying that politically just societies must be wealthy
societies, or that all societies should have the same levels of wealth.
There exist impoverished societies in which life is generally nasty, brutish and short, or "burdened societies" as
Rawls calls them. Some may not have governments worthy of the name, and may exist primarily as
kleptocracies. Some might have well-intentioned governments, but "may lack the political and cultural
traditions, the human capital and know-how, and, often, the material and technological resources needed to be
well-ordered."36 Some may be decent.
The duty of assistance to such societies requires a strategy of carefully understanding and targeting appropriate
specific shortfalls, and not a reductive all-purpose end-state egalitarian/economic redistribution. One could
easily imagine a scale of material well-being for societies which begins with burdened states, and which is
developed in empirical detail to include those conditions which stabilize them in the form of decent consultation
hierarchies or democratic states. One could also easily imagine Rawls allowing the empirical details to be
worked out as involving micro-structural issues which lie beyond the scope of his political philosophy.
The second answerable difficulty concerns whether international law (or foreign policy) should be thought of in
moral terms only as an afterthought, if at all?
A tough-minded version of realism might be thought to argue that morals play no basic guiding role in the
formulation of foreign policy.
This sort of argument has a long and "distinguished" history: Henry Kissinger's invocation of realpolitik
during the Vietnam conflict, Clausewitz's 19th century doctrine of war, and Thucydides' views as already
briefly discussed (from the 5th century B.C.E.) are often seen as paradigmatic realist accounts. The anti-realist
moralist is apt to be seen as a hopeless idealist. Particularly, advocating moral constraints on behavior during
war may be seen as unsophisticated, and even dangerous.
Rawls resists these aspects of realism, and views the denial of the relevance of moral considerations as
sophistical--as less than carefully thought out.
First, Rawls points out that "it would be unfair to Clausewitz not to add that for him the state's interests can
include regulative moral aims of whatever kind."37
Second, Rawls could easily add that no one of any intellectual stature justifies the Serb's raping of Bosnian
women as an acceptable instrument of war. An earlier version of The Law of Peoples was published as part of
an Amnesty International volume along with Catherine MacKinnon's "Crimes of War, Crimes of Peace," in
which she argues for trying rape as a war crime. In The Law of Peoples Rawls absolutely rejects the unqualified
inference from General Sherman's "war is hell" to the conclusion that normative/moral considerations do not
apply in times of war.38 He cites Sherman's own doctrine distinguishing property and persons during
Sherman's march through Georgia as some evidence that Sherman's own view was more sophisticated than is
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sometimes acknowledged.39 Though all this does not establish a full positive account concerning moral
constraints on behavior during war, it is evidence of the recognition of a level of behavior below which one will
not allow the conduct of war to fall, at least not without recognizing the appropriateness of sanction against
those who violate the rules.
Third: The Law of Peoples contains numerous references to acts of war which have been appropriately criticized
on moral grounds, particularly where civilians have been targeted (the firebombing of Dresden, the atomic
bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki). These are cases where civilians were targeted on the grounds that
soldier's lives would be saved and the war shortened, but the case was not based on showing that the conditions
of the Supreme Emergency Exemption were met. The latter is the only case in which targeting civilians is
justified on a Rawlsian view. More generally, in cases of immoral military uses of power, Rawls argues that we
can often properly make harsh judgments about winning military strategies even in defense of democracy
against extremism. Such questions of moral judgment are not axiomatically settled in favor of victors who
successfully advocated maximal uses of force. Ex post moral criticisms may be legitimate, and might guide
future action in ways that make it the world a more just place-particularly in signaling a transparent resolve to
work towards permanent and lasting peace.
The third answerable difficulty concerns the necessity of creating democracies. Wouldn't it be better to view the
ultimate goal of achieving an international order as the creation of democracies rather than accepting non-
democratic consultation hierarchies as full partners? This concern has been at the heart of Rawls' perhaps most
distinguished critic's remarks. Thomas Pogge, in "Rawls on International Justice," argues that in moving
towards the legitimization of the interests of "peoples," Rawls loses the moral leverage of normative
individualism, thereby forfeiting the analytical advantages of insisting upon individual freedom and equality.
Were Rawls to stump for the ubiquitous creation of liberal democracies with their commitment to normative
individualism he could remedy this flaw.40
Rawls' commitment to political pluralism is a trump here: Kazanistan and other decent non-democratic
consultation hierarchies are sufficiently just, in his view, to be legitimate nation-state members of the
international society of peoples. It is of some obvious interest that Rawls picks a Muslim state as his model of a
decent consultation hierarchy.
Eleven of the forty-seven Muslim nations in the world are democracies, and if one thinks that the possibility of
decent forms of reciprocity exist in non-democratic societies (what would logically rule it out?) then one is likely
to think that the prospects for a just international order require recognition of alternative forms of decent
society. With at least 1.2 billion Muslims in the world, the Muslim state seems a good place to begin, particularly
as Islam is the world's fastest growing religion. There may well be more Muslim states that come to be
consultation hierarchies than western-style democracies. For Rawls the commitment to pluralism implies
theoretical acceptance of potentially just non-liberal states, just as it has always required our (almost entirely
theoretical) acceptance of just Rawlsian liberal ones.
The fourth answerable difficulty is that the unthinkable has happened, and we have been attacked by outlaws
on September 11th. How should we think about just war here-and-now?
Rawls' doctrine of just war, both in the imperfect compliance situation and in ideal theory, justifies war in cases
of self-defense as well as in cases where a society egregiously violates the basic rights of its citizens. In very
radical circumstances, say were England to be the last surviving democracy and her existence imperiled by Nazi
attack, the Supreme Emergency Exemption could be invoked.41 That exemption could make civilians the
legitimate target of military activity as a last-ditch-defense of democracy against fascism. In the following
article, professor Fiala argues that a Kantian would have grave difficulty with this aspect of Rawls' view.
Such a survival situation, where the extinction of a well-embedded and decent way of life is at stake, seems rare
indeed. But situations of self-defense or where a society egregiously violates citizen's rights occur with some
frequency. Many societies, including some of the non-democratic Muslim societies mentioned earlier, may
instantiate deeply unjust conditions (routine use of torture, no shared sense of the rule of law for the common
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good). Military intervention in their affairs might be justified on Rawlsean grounds. Though this topic is of
great interest, we here restrict ourselves to the issue of self-defense after an attack like that of 9-11.
Engaging in a justified war of self-defense would be only the beginning of a Rawlsian response to an attack. He
makes practical distinctions, and he appeals to a principled way of framing just-war policy in order to
maximize the possibility of achieving a just and lasting peace. Among the practical distinctions is that when at
war with an outlaw state we must differentiate between its leaders, its civilians, and its soldiers. Leaders are to
be held responsible. Soldiers are to be given an opportunity to surrender, as they may not be willing
combatants. Civilians are to be protected. "Collateral damage" to civilians would be unjustified on a Rawlsian
view in every circumstance except one in which the Supreme Exemption is invoked properly.42 On our reading,
taking care to reduce harm to civilians to an absolute minimum is a condition sine qua non of a causes' being
just during a time of war.
Our second set of questions has no easy answer in Rawls, so far as we can see: (1) What is the prospect of
democracies representing only the reasonable interests of their peoples as arrived at through the proper
intersubjective reasoning? (2) What is the prospect for their being decent non-democratic consultation
hierarchies sufficiently and adequately known to be so? (3) If there were, as Rawls imagines, a working cluster
of just liberal democracies and decent consultation hierarchies, how much can we say about their multilateral
and collaborative efforts from our realist-guided vantage point? (4) Is Rawls' view coherent? (Do accounts
based on "peoples" typically move in a quite different direction? As a political liberal can Rawls recommend
killing civilians under any circumstances?)
Some of these questions are for another time. But one discomforting question, raised in professor Fiala's article,
is whether Rawls' view simply resembles a component of a rival comprehensive doctrine to those who do not
share liberal values. In particular, the existence of the Rawlsian "Supreme Emergency Exemption,"an
exemption which allows the killing of innocent civilians in exceptional circumstances, may make it appear that
Rawls' conclusions about attack allow for the killing of civilians whenever followers of an established way of life
properly deem their circumstances to be exceptional. Perhaps, professor Fiala suggests, the Supreme Emergency
Exemption is too strong for political liberalism to support, particularly since neither a Christian nor a Kantian
philosophy of history can be comfortably adduced to provide a basis in a liberal democratic "overlapping
consensus" for its deliberate targeting of civilians.
H. Eugene Cline 
Albion College 
Notes
1. Thanks to Professor Bindu Madhok for many helpful suggestions. Thanks to Laura Jordan for her careful
reading and assistance. Errors of fact or interpretation are mine alone. Thanks to Professor Andrew Grossman
who championed the leave which gave rise to this project.
2. John Rawls, The Law of Peoples, (Cambridge, Harvard, 1999), p. 46
3. ibid. , p. 29. For Rawls the "reasonable" is not specifiable in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions (p.
87). In a reasonable (just) social order, class distinctions (indexed by income and wealth) are reasonable insofar
as they are recognizably functionally necessary for a market system of exchange to exist. Differences between
comprehensive (typically religious) doctrines are accommodated on a basis of overlapping consensus among
them concerning the political essentials, i.e., voting, freedom of expression, freedom of worship, right to trial or
the like. Differences of race and gender do not debilitate or even strike with much (if any) force in a reasonable
society. These conditions and others like them being met, all citizens in the society that meets them exist in a
social environment in which proper self-respect and proper moral satisfaction with society are both likely and
warranted.
4. Ibid. p. 28.
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5. Ibid. p. 46.
6. In Montesquieu's sense of gentle manners (moers douces) and Rousseau's sense of self-respect (amour-
propre). Ibid., p. 46, pp. 34-5, 47 for Montesquieu and Rousseau respectively.
7. Though, one takes it, the interpretation of such an event will not always be uniform, particularly in a large
pluralistic democracy. The American South, for instance, may continue to construe the Civil War as having
been principally about states' rights. Northerners may typically construe it as having been primarily about
slavery. And these divisions may sway the community of professional historians first one way, and then the
other.
8. I have deliberately chosen Ronald Dworkin's terminology to characterize "reciprocity." There is some
evidence that Rawls would endorse this move. There are two caveats here: I do not mean to imply that Rawls is
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